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ABSTRACT
Accurate and trusted identiﬁers are a centerpiece for any
security architecture. Protecting against Sybil attacks in a
privacy-friendly manner is a non-trivial problem in wireless
infrastructureless networks, such as mobile ad hoc networks.
In this paper, we introduce self-certiﬁed Sybil-free pseudo-
nyms as a means to provide privacy-friendly Sybil-freeness
without requiring continuous online availability of a trusted
third party. These pseudonyms are self-certiﬁed and com-
puted by the users themselves from their cryptographic long-
term identities. Contrary to identity certiﬁcates, we preserve
location privacy and improve protection against some noto-
rious attacks on anonymous communication systems.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.2 [Network
Protocols]: Applications; Protocol Architecture.
General Terms: Security.
Keywords: Identities, Privacy, Sybil Attack.
1. INTRODUCTION
Today, many users cooperate in networked environments.
Often, these systems depend on a majority of users being
honest for tasks like voting in virtual community, reputa-
tion computation, or traﬃc mixing. Unless such systems
implement expensive countermeasures they fall prey to the
Sybil Attack [5], which entails a single attacker controlling
arbitrarily many user accounts (Sybil identities). Further,
both identity certiﬁcates and advanced non-centralized Sybil
defence mechanisms [7,15] are highly privacy-invasive.
We deﬁne an identity domain as a domain uniquely deﬁn-
ing the context in which a set of user identiﬁers can be used.
The context can include parameters such as validity time,
location, and application. Ideally, an identity domain should
provide a Sybil-free environment (i.e., absent of Sybil iden-
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tities) in which applications can be deployed. This paper
shows how, given one initial Sybil-free identity domain, we
can propagate the Sybil-freeness to arbitrary many identity
domains, where in every identity domain each user is known
under a diﬀerent and unique pseudonym, and further there
is no need for any continuous involvement of a Trusted Third
Party (TTP), as access to a Certiﬁcate Authority (CA) is
required only for bootstrapping a Sybil-free domain
1. These
pseudonyms are part of a cryptographic framework that we
call self-certiﬁed Sybil-free pseudonyms.
To participate in our scheme, a user U must ﬁrst enroll
with the CA to acquire one membership certiﬁcate certU.
Using the membership certiﬁcate, the user can now create
one self-certiﬁed pseudonym P(U,ctx) per newly created iden-
tity domain (where each domain has a publicly announced
identiﬁer ctx). Membership certiﬁcates can be used for issu-
ing pseudonyms for arbitrarily many identity domains, but
the pseudonyms are only valid within the domain they were
issued for. Pseudonyms issued for diﬀerent domains are mu-
tually unlinkable, and they cannot be linked to their under-
lying membership certiﬁcate even by the CA.
Self-certiﬁed pseudonyms can be useful for applications
such as anonymous communication systems, e-voting, Byzan-
tine fault tolerance, distributed double spending detection,
ﬁle sharing, reputation systems, chat rooms or forums, in-
stant messaging, and e-commerce platforms. They are par-
ticularly suitable for infrastructureless wireless networks, as
in these environments the online availability of a CA cannot
be guaranteed. Therefore, we describe an application sce-
nario in which we augment Crowds [12] with our scheme to
provide Sybil-free anonymous communication in an ad hoc
network. We also provide a general security analysis and a
discussion on the security of the application scenario.
The paper is organized as follows. Related work is given
in Section 2, while Section 3 presents our solution. Section 4
analyzes the security properties of the self-certiﬁed pseudo-
nyms while our application scenario is described in Section
5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
1Identity domains can be trivially constructed assuming the
continuous availability of a TTP. The main problems with
this approach are its privacy implications, as the TTP can
link all pseudonyms to the issuing user, and the need for a
continuous availability of a TTP, which cannot be guaran-
teed in environments such as mobile ad hoc networks.2. RELATED WORK
Below follows related work on Sybil attack protection and
techniques for creating unlinkable and unique pseudonyms.
2.1 The Sybil Attack
Levine et al. [7] have recently provided a comprehensive
survey on countermeasures against the Sybil attack for a
wide range of applications. On the basis of this survey, the
following strategies against the Sybil attacks were found:
• Trusted certiﬁcation: This strategy is based on a cen-
tral authority establishing a Sybil-free identity domain
by binding each entity to a single cryptographic identi-
ﬁer (often, an identity certiﬁcate). Douceur has shown
that this approach is the only approach fully capable of
preventing Sybil attacks [5]. This strategy usually has
an expensive setup as the initial assignment of identi-
ﬁers is usually done by manual intervention. Another
challenge is privacy as identity certiﬁcates can be used
to proﬁle users (multiple certiﬁcate shows are linkable).
• Resource testing: This strategy tries to identify Sybil
nodes by distributing tasks to all network nodes, such
as computing or storage capability tests. The under-
lying assumption is that an attacker does not possess
enough resources to perform the additional tests im-
posed on each Sybil node. Some drawbacks regarding
resource testing are listed in [5].
• Recurring costs and fees: A variant of resource testing
where identities are periodically re-validated using re-
source tests. Often, this entails that each participating
identity is periodically charged with a certain fee.
• Trusted devices: This strategy, which can be combined
with trusted certiﬁcation, binds one hardware device
to one network entity. The main problem with this
approach is that there exist no eﬃcient way to prevent
one entity from obtaining multiple hardware devices
other than manual intervention.
• Domain speciﬁc: Some of the surveyed countermea-
sures are application-domain speciﬁc. For example,
Piro et al. [11] have proposed a detection mechanism
for ad hoc networks based on the fact that Sybil nodes
in mobile ad hoc networks normally move in clusters.
Our proposal builds on trusted certiﬁcation. The solutions
analyzed in [7] belonging to this category are either only
applicable for speciﬁc scenarios, requiring online interaction
with a TTP, or failing to preserve user privacy. Our proposal
is more general and does not suﬀer from these limitations.
It can be compared to traditional identity certiﬁcates, but it
also oﬀers unlinkability between multiple certiﬁcate shows.
2.2 Cryptographic Related Work
Diﬀerent cryptographic systems can be used to create un-
linkable and unique pseudonyms. As long as the identiﬁ-
cation of “double-spent” pseudonyms is not an issue, such
pseudonyms can be realized based on the so-called epoch
number of direct anonymous attestation [1]. Schemes that
support identiﬁcation were presented in [2] and [3]. By
binding a diﬀerent tag to every identity domain, k-times
anonymous authentication [13] can be used to create unique
pseudonyms. Our scheme uses the cryptographic techniques
of Camenisch et al. [2] (i.e., e-tokens), but can be seen as a
more general systems framework that could also be instan-
tiated using other cryptographic techniques.
3. SOLUTION DESCRIPTION
This section presents the technical description of how self-
certiﬁed Sybil-free pseudonyms are constructed and used.
We assume that (i) the CA is capable of establishing the
initial Sybil-free domain
2; (ii) identity domain identiﬁers
ctx are unique; and, (iii) devices are capable of performing
the necessary cryptographic functions. Regarding the at-
tacker model, we consider attackers seeking to (i) deploy a
Sybil attack in a given identity domain and (ii) identify a re-
lationship between two pseudonyms generated for diﬀerent
identity domains to ﬁnd out if those pseudonyms belong to
the same user. We assume that attackers are able to eaves-
drop on all network communication, but each attacker has
at most one membership certiﬁcate certU.
3.1 E-Token Signatures
We use a special signature scheme for creating pseudo-
nym certiﬁcates: Camenisch et al. have proposed a protocol
for periodically spendable e-tokens [2]. In their scenario,
sensors spend an e-token whenever they report some data.
Yet, it is only possible to compute k diﬀerent e-tokens per
time period. Consequently, sensors can ﬁle at most k re-
ports per time period anonymously. Otherwise the sensors
have to spend some e-token twice, which allows everyone to
compute the sensor’s identity from these two e-token show
transcripts.
While k-spendable e-tokens provide the necessary main
functionality for our proposal, we adapt their solution in
several ways: (i) while their show protocol is interactive we
require non-interactive publicly veriﬁable shows for signa-
ture veriﬁcation; (ii) we bind a temporal public key to the
e-token show – the public key is the message that is signed;
(iii) instead of time periods we limit the number of gener-
ated e-tokens per signing context – while a context has a
validity period, it may also have a name and other charac-
teristics; and, (iv) we use a version optimized for k = 1.
The ﬁrst two properties are obtained by applying the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic [6], a cryptographic trick that turns certain
interactive identiﬁcation protocols into signature schemes.
Instead of a time period t, we use an arbitrary context iden-
tiﬁer ctx. The value ctx can be seen as identifying the con-
text in which a signer is allowed to sign only once.
The e-token based signature scheme consists of the algo-
rithms IKg, UKg, Obtain, Issue, Sign, V erify, Identify,
and Revoke. These algorithms are executed by the issuer I
of e-token dispensers, the user U, and the signature veriﬁers:
– IKg(1
k) and UKg(1
k,pkI) – creates the issuers key
pair (pkI,skI) and the user’s key pair (pkU,skU), re-
spectively. The value k is the security parameter;
– Obtain(pkI,skU) ↔ Issue(pkU,skI) – at the end of
this protocol between a user and the e-token issuer,
the user obtains an e-token dispenser D that can be
2This assumption is not exclusive for our scheme. In any
certiﬁcate-based scheme, be it a fully centralized or com-
pletely distributed model (or something in between), some
entity/entities must be trusted not to hand out more than
one credential per identity.Table 1: A summary of the notation used on the
conceptual and the solution level.
Conceptual Level Solution Level
membership certiﬁcate certU dispenser D
pseudonym certiﬁcate cert(U,ctx) transcript τ
pseudo-random pseudonym P(U,ctx) serial number S
public key pk(U,ctx) message m
domain identiﬁer, context descriptor ctx
used to create one e-token based signature per ctx. I
stores pkU and revocation information rD under the
user’s identity;
– Sign(m,D,pkI,ctx) – shows an e-token from dispenser
D in context ctx to sign a message m. The outputs
are a token serial number (TSN) S, a transcript τ, and
an updated e-token dispenser D
0;
– V erify(m,S,τ,pkI,ctx) – checks that S and τ were
created by a valid dispenser D to sign a message m in
context ctx;
– Identify(pkI,S,τ,τ
0,m,m
0) – given two records (S,τ)
and (S,τ
0) created by a dispenser D when signing m
and m
0, m 6= m
0, respectively, Identify computes the
public key pkU of the owner of D;
– Revoke(skI,pkI,rD) – takes as input skI and pkI and
the revocation information rD that corresponds to a
particular user (see Obtain). It outputs an updated
issuer public key pk
0
I. The dispenser D is revoked and
can no longer be used to create signatures that verify
under this updated issuing key.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that all parties use
the most up-to-date issuer key for signing and veriﬁcation.
For details on the cryptographic constructions, see [8].
3.2 InstantiationbasedonE-TokenSignatures
This section describes how to implement Sybil-free self-
certiﬁed pseudonyms using e-token signatures. The pseudo-
nym certiﬁcates cert(U,ctx) that come with the self-certiﬁed
pseudonyms provide three main functions: (i) binding of
a freshly generated public key to the pseudonym (as with
identity certiﬁcates); (ii) veriﬁcation of the pseudonym and
the binding; and (iii) disclosure of the user identity and
revocation of her certiﬁcates should the same membership
certiﬁcate be used to create two diﬀerent pseudonym certiﬁ-
cates for the same identity domain.
The interaction model of our proposal consists of two
“phases”, one enrollment phase in which an initial Sybil-
free identity domain is established, and one identity domain
buildup and use phase where users create and maintain iden-
tity domains derived from the original identity domain. See
Table 1 for a summary of our notation for the conceptual
and the solution level, while the entities of our system and
the roles they may assume are listed in Table 2.
3.2.1 Enrollment
This phase involves several users and one issuer – the cer-
tiﬁcate authority I. Initially I generates an e-token issuing
key pair (pkI,skI) using IKg. To enroll, a user U creates
a membership key pair (pkU,skU) using UKg. She trans-
fers pkU to I and authenticates under her identity for the
Sybil-free identity space. In turn, U and I interact using
the Obtain(pkI,skU) ↔ Issue(pkU,skI) protocol. In this
way U obtains an e-token dispenser D. It is used as her
membership certiﬁcate certU (see Table 1).
3.2.2 Identity domain buildup and use
In this phase, users collectively buildup and participate
in identity domains. It consists of three subphases, during
which a subset of the users may take the roles of domain
controller and/or veriﬁer.
1. Identity domain context creation. To create a context
for an identity domain, a domain controller publishes
a domain identiﬁer ctx. As a heuristic, a long-lived ctx
should follow some kind of URI-like (Uniform Resource
Identiﬁer) scheme and a short-lived ctx should include
the identity domain’s validity time. The uniqueness of
the domain identiﬁers used by U can be guaranteed un-
der three conditions: (i) U never turns back her clock;
(ii) U keeps a list of all her used domain identiﬁers and
removes records from the list only if the corresponding
identity domains have expired; and (iii) U only joins
domains that have not yet expired and whose domain
identiﬁers are not already in her list.
In addition, ctx may contain the name of the domain,
the public key of the domain controller, or even a con-
tract that all of the users who join the domain should
agree on. From a practical point of view, there is no
hard limit on the size of ctx. It can be hashed down
to a constant size value before being used in the cryp-
tographic algorithms. Appending the hash to the va-
lidity time makes the uniqueness of ctx independent
from the collision resistance of the hash function.
As the identity domain controller does not need to be
trusted, any user (or several users) could perform this
role. Besides managing ctx, the identity domain con-
troller will often be responsible for distributing pseudo-
nym certiﬁcates.
2. Pseudonym certiﬁcate creation and veriﬁcation. Reg-
istration at an identity domain is done using the triplet
(pk(U,ctx),P(U,ctx),cert(U,ctx)), generated as follows: a
user U with a membership certiﬁcate certU wants to
certify a new application speciﬁc and hitherto uncerti-
ﬁed public/private key pair, which we will from now on
call (pk(U,ctx),sk(U,ctx)). She creates a pseudo-random
pseudonym P(U,ctx) for a given ctx using the e-token
to sign pk(U,ctx). The Sign(pk(U,ctx),certU,pkI,ctx)
algorithm outputs an e-token-based signature (S,τ).
U uses the e-token’s serial number S as her pseudo-
random pseudonym P(U,ctx), and the transcript τ as
her pseudonym certiﬁcate cert(U,ctx) (see Table 1).
Everyone can now verify the correctness of cert(U,ctx)
using V erify(pk(U,ctx),P(U,ctx),cert(U,ctx),pkI,ctx).
Table 2: A summary of the system entities and their
respective roles.
Entities Trusted Possible Roles
Certiﬁcate Authority Yes Issuer
User No User, veriﬁer,
domain controllerAfterwards, the uniqueness of the pseudonym can be
checked by comparing P(U,ctx) with the pseudonyms of
the other certiﬁcates for this domain.
3. Misuser identiﬁcation and revocation. By executing
Identify, it is possible to extract the membership pub-
lic key pkU of a user from two pseudonym registrations
(pk(U,ctx),P(U,ctx),cert(U,ctx)) and (pk
0
(U,ctx),P
0
(U,ctx),
cert
0
(U,ctx)) if P(U,ctx) = P
0
(U,ctx) (assured by the sys-
tem) and pk(U,ctx) 6= pk
0
(U,ctx). Identify(pkT,P(U,ctx),
cert(U,ctx),cert
0
(U,ctx),pk(U,ctx),pk
0
(U,ctx)) will output
pkU. Then, certU can be revoked using Revoke. Note
that we do not view a user who reuses the same public
key pk(U,ctx) as a Sybil attacker. She is just using the
same short term identity again.
3.3 Efﬁciency
The overall costs of our system are linear in the size of
the identity domain with respect to users joining the do-
main, and quadratic with respect to the veriﬁcation of the
Sybil property: every user needs to execute the Sign al-
gorithm for herself, and the Verify algorithm for all other
users. The construction in [2] requires 10 multi-base expo-
nentiations for pseudonym certiﬁcate creation and a similar
number of multi-exponentiations for veriﬁcation. See [8] for
a writeup of the protocol details. Using multi-base expo-
nentiation tricks, multi-base exponentiations can be made
almost as eﬃcient as normal exponentiations. This com-
pares to schemes that do not support identiﬁcation with
about half the number of multi-exponentiations, and ordi-
nary CA-issued pseudonym certiﬁcates with one or two ex-
ponentiations. Veriﬁcation may not be needed in all cases,
e.g., if users trust the domain controller to verify users on
their behalf, or if the application bases its security proper-
ties on the assumption that only a set of key users are not
Sybil nodes, rather than every single user.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section discusses how our proposal ensures the Sybil-
freeness of identity domains and the unlinkability of self-
certiﬁed pseudonyms. We also discuss sharing and theft of
membership certiﬁcates.
4.1 The Sybil-Proof & Unlinkability Property
Sybil-Proof Property: the cryptographic properties of e-
token signatures ensure that for each valid membership cer-
tiﬁcate there can exist only one unique pseudonym P(U,ctx)
per identity domain (see Section 3.1). However, as there
is no inherent trust in any user in the identity domain (in-
cluding the domain controller), users have to check the cor-
rectness of the pseudonym certiﬁcate cert(U,ctx) of all other
users in the domain by locally running V erify. After an
honest user has ﬁnished this veriﬁcation and has checked the
uniqueness of P(U,ctx), she is assured that her communica-
tion partner is a real user with public key pk(U,ctx), provided
that she authenticated with sk(U,ctx).
Unlinkability Property: our approach has strong unlink-
ability properties as the cryptographic properties of the e-
token signatures ensure the algorithmic unlinkability of two
pseudonym certiﬁcates generated for diﬀerent domains (see
Section 3.1). However, should the users violate precautions
on the network or application layers, the attacker may still
be able to make an educated guess on whether two arbitrary
pseudonym certiﬁcates from diﬀerent identity domains are
related or not. In a real word scenario, a variety of diﬀerent
information could help the attacker to make such a guess,
for instance, the location property of the identity domain or
the location of the user. A traﬃc analysis of each setting is
required to assess the concrete threats to the users’ privacy.
4.2 Membership Certiﬁcate Sharing/Theft
In order to commit an identity-based attack, an attacker
must either forge a membership certiﬁcate, create multiple
pseudonym certiﬁcates for the same ctx, or misuse other
users’ membership certiﬁcates through theft or sharing. The
ﬁrst two options are infeasible, as they would force the at-
tacker to break the underlying e-token scheme (see Section
3.1). The remaining viable strategies are sharing and theft:
• By sharing c membership certiﬁcates among c corrupt
users, an attack can be launched. Still, in contrast
to a Sybil attack where one attacker injects c forged
identities into a network, an attacker must now inject
c certiﬁed (yet misused) pseudonyms in one identity
domain – notably more diﬃcult (and less eﬀective be-
cause of its boundness) than a Sybil attack. Sharing
can be hindered by equipping the users’ devices with
Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) or a similar hard-
ware token, and then storing the secrets related to the
membership certiﬁcate in the TPM. Another option
is to include personal information in the membership
certiﬁcate (e.g., a credit card number) that is auto-
matically disclosed in case of sharing.
• A corrupted user can also try to steal membership cer-
tiﬁcates from honest users. The magnitude of such an
attack would be the same as with sharing, and here, as
well as in the former attack, there is a possibility for
I to revoke the stolen membership certiﬁcates given
that the attack is detected and the membership public
keys are recovered through Identify.
Corrupted users that share membership certiﬁcates can be
identiﬁed if they register two diﬀerent pseudonym certiﬁ-
cates (with diﬀerent public keys) for the same identity do-
main. Users could agree on using the same public key, for
instance by generating pk(U,ctx) according to some determin-
istic function f, i.e., pk(U,ctx) = f(ctx). Attackers applying
this strategy can still be detected and banned from the cur-
rent identity domain, but they cannot be identiﬁed
3. How-
ever, this means that attackers have to trust each other, as
all of them will know every sk(U,ctx). Therefore, the advan-
tage for the attackers appears dubitable, when compared to
the online-coordinated use of multiple identities, which is of
course always possible.
4.3 Corrupt Domain Controllers
A malicious domain controller may do the following:
• She may choose a preexisting ctx. Should a user create
a second pseudonym certiﬁcate for ctx, an attacker can
run the Identify algorithm to de-anonymize the user.
This attack is thwarted by keeping a list of already
3Protection against this attack requires interactivity. In
such a protocol the domain controller (or other online par-
ties) could contribute randomness to the generation of the
public/private key or the pseudonym certiﬁcate.used ctx’s for the validity period speciﬁed by ctx. If a
user sees an already used ctx when joining a domain,
it is most probably a reused ctx.
• In cases where the identity domain controller is respon-
sible for distributing the pseudonym certiﬁcates, she
can help users that share an identity and unexpectedly
joined the same identity domain to avoid identiﬁcation
by only publishing one of the pseudonym certiﬁcates.
• An attacker acting as a gateway between the identity
domain controller and a subset of honest users may
cause a partitioning of the network. Doing so, she can
merely prevent sharing attackers from being identiﬁed.
While in practice all of these attacks should be considered
relevant, none of them allow the attacker to break the Sybil-
proof and unlinkability properties.
5. MOBILE AD HOC CROWDS
This section elaborates on a scenario for Sybil-free anony-
mous communication in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs)
using Crowds [12]. An anonymous communication should
ideally make sure that nodes on virtual paths between send-
ers and receivers belong to diﬀerent entities, or else the ano-
nymity properties may be compromised by an attacker con-
trolling a large portion of the nodes in the user group [9].
Yet, in the context of infrastructureless networks, current
mechanisms either fail to enforce this Sybil-freeness in a
privacy-preserving manner or are not compatible with wire-
less infrastructureless networks, such as ad hoc networks
4.
Below, we describe how to apply our self-certiﬁed pseudo-
nyms to augment Crowds with privacy-friendly admission
control features. Before the scenario walkthrough, the cho-
sen anonymous communication mechanism and network en-
vironment are brieﬂy introduced.
• Crowds transfers messages anonymously through vir-
tual paths created randomly based on a global prob-
ability of forwarding [12]. The user base is denoted a
crowd, and all users in the crowd run a local jondo ap-
plication. Also, a central blender application handles
user memberships, i.e., enables users to join the crowd.
Some of the inherent roles and concepts in Crowds ﬁt
well with those of our system (e.g., the responsibilities
of the blender). The features provided by our proposal
allow us to go beyond Crowds, as traditional Crowds
neither protects against the Sybil attack nor provides
reliable long-term identiﬁers.
• In mobile ad hoc networks it is natural to assume that
users take turns in performing crucial roles. Thus, the
role of the domain controller (i.e., the blender) can
be passed on among the network users. This should
not be seen as a disadvantage, as the domain con-
troller does not have to be trusted (corrupt domain
controllers can temporarily disrupt the network, but
cannot break the Sybil-free/unlinkability properties).
Also, collectively anonymizing network traﬃc mainly
involves traﬃc routing, a standard procedure in ad hoc
4It is generally easier to mount Sybil attacks in ad hoc set-
tings as the common countermeasures in ﬁxed networks,
such as selecting nodes with IP addresses from diﬀerent ju-
risdictions or subnetworks, are not applicable.
<ctx>
<application>Crowds<\ application>
<valid fr>2007−02−10 16 :00 GMT <\ valid fr>
<valid to>2007−02−11 16 :00 GMT <\ valid to>
<loc>Wondercompany , Wonderland<\ loc>
<ran nonce>0F59765E7ED3E67C<\ran nonce>
<issuer>pk(U1,ctx)<\ issuer>
<\ctx>
Figure 1: Example of a ctx for mobile ad hoc Crowds.
networks. Moreover, it is usually regarded acceptable
to assume that users in a mobile ad hoc network occa-
sionally have intermittent connectivity with the Inter-
net, where they then may interact with a CA. The fa-
vorable peer-to-peer nature and adaptation of Crowds
to an ad hoc scenario have been previously shown [9].
5.1 Scenario Walkthrough
• Acquiring a membership certiﬁcate: A prerequisite for
joining an identity domain (the crowd) is that a user U
obtained a membership certiﬁcate certU in beforehand
during a time when U had connectivity with I.
• Creating an identity domain: To buildup an identity
domain, a user, say U1, becomes the domain controller,
to which other users (possessing a valid certU) may
register. The domain controller chooses a ctx (see
Fig. 1) and signs it with sk(U1,ctx). The context ctx
is broadcasted and users approving of it register by
sending cert(U,ctx) back to the domain controller.
• Domain participation and veriﬁcation: In turn, en-
rolled users participate in anonymous communication
over Crowds. Within the identity domain’s validity
period (speciﬁed in ctx), new users may join by reg-
istering at the domain controller, and existing users
may leave. To inform users about newly enrolled users,
the domain controller periodically broadcaststhe certi-
ﬁed pseudonyms of enrolled users (including temporal
network addresses, see Fig. 2). To ensure that the
identity domain is Sybil-free (in particular, the virtual
paths), all users assert that the other users possess
valid certiﬁed pseudonyms by locally running V erify
– at least once for each pseudonym during the identity
domain’s validity period. Full veriﬁcation may hamper
scalability, especially for low-end devices. Yet, as men-
tioned in Section 3.3, there are strategies that could be
applied to improve scalability. Further, probabilistic
protection against having a Sybil node in the vulner-
able ﬁrst position in the path may be ensured by only
verifying the correctness of the pseudonym certiﬁcate
of the ﬁrst user in the path and a subset of the other
users. This strategy saves computational power, but
it may give a false notion regarding the anonymity set
size.
• Dissolving an identity domain: Deciding on the valid-
ity period of an identity domain is a trade-oﬀ between
usability and privacy. Long validity periods reduce pri-
vacy, as users can be proﬁled under a certain pseudo-
nym for a longer time. This opens the door for long-
term intersection/disclosure attacks. Yet, brief valid-
ity periods increase the rate at which paths and long-{cert(U1,ctx),P(U1,ctx),pk(U1,ctx),{IP,MAC}U1};
{cert(U2,ctx),P(U2,ctx),pk(U2,ctx),{IP,MAC}U2};
···
{cert(Un,ctx),P(Un,ctx),pk(Un,ctx),{IP,MAC}Un}
Figure 2: Example of a pseudonym list disseminated
by the domain controller.
lived connections in Crowds must be torn down, result-
ing in usability problems and performance loss. After
the validity period of ctx has expired, the pseudonym
certiﬁcates stored at the domain controller automati-
cally become invalid. Now, to preserve unlinkability,
the users should change their {IP, MAC}-pairs before
entering a new domain
5.
5.2 Security Properties of the App. Scenario
Our proposal protects Crowds against the Sybil attack
as a single user trying to register twice can be detected.
Moreover, the domain controller (or other users) can expose
the misbehaving user through Identify, and the CA can
revoke the membership certiﬁcate with Revoke. Further, as
described below, our scheme improves protection regarding
predecessor attacks [10, 12, 14] and intersection/disclosure
attacks [4] against Crowds (see [8] for more details):
• The predecessor attack is made more diﬃcult as the
Sybil-proof property helps to reduce the ratio of hon-
est vs. corrupted users and the unlinkability property
hampers the inherent assumption regarding long-lived
communications.
• The validity period of ctx can be adjusted so that
the required number of observations for an intersec-
tion/disclosure attacker is never reached by a realistic
attacker. The unlinkability property of the pseudonym
certiﬁcate and the {IP, MAC}-pair changes ensure that
the attack has to be redone for new identity domains.
6. SUMMARY & OUTLOOK
In this paper, we presented a solution to the Sybil at-
tack that does not require online connectivity to a TTP
and preserves user privacy. Our scheme is particularly suit-
able for being deployed in infrastructureless wireless net-
works. We have provided a security analysis of our proposal
and showed how the anonymous communications mechanism
Crowds can beneﬁt from our approach when deployed in a
mobile ad hoc network. Future work includes a proof-of-
concept prototype for the scenario in Section 5 as well as an
experimental performance evaluation of the cryptographic
primitives.
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7. ADDITIONAL AUTHORS
5Also, the transmission power can be changed to obfuscate
device location.
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